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The second half of the 20'~  century has seen a tuniult~tous  history unfold in Chrna 
the  early years of communist nile in the 1950's culminating in the Great Famine, the 
Cultural Revolution and its aftermath in the late 1960s and the 1970s, the reform of 
agriculture in the late 1970s and the 1980s, and an explosion of trade and foreign direct 
investment in the late 1980s and the 1990s. All these eveiits have affected the course of 
economic growth and income distribution.  However, while a large literature has studied 
growth through these different phases of Chinese history (e.g., McMillan et al., 1989; 
Fan, 1991; Lin, 1992; Wei, 1995; Li; 1997; Fan, Zhang, and Robinson, 19991, few studies 
have matched the evolution of inequality over the long run with these different periods in 
Communist Chinese history over its entire course. 
This paper presents and analyses the evolution of Chinese regional inequality 
since the Communist revollttion right up to the present.  Most studies on China's 
inequality (e.g., Hussain et a]., 1994; Khan et at. 1993; Chen and Ravallion, 1996; 
hberge  aid Li, 1997; Tsui, 1998) have focused on relatively short periods, mostly 
during the post-reform years, making use of the new household surveys that became 
available during this period. Of the studies which come closest to the spirit of our interest 
in Chinese inequality over the long run, Tsui (1991) stops in  1985 and Lyons (1991) 
stops in 1987, just as the increase in trade and foreign direct investment was beginning; 
Yang and Cai (2000) go up to 1996, hut focus only on the rural-urban gap at the national 
Icvel; and Kanbur and Zhang (1999) disaggregate down to the rural-urban level within 
provinces to calculate a regional i~icquality  index, and present a deco~llposition  of regional inequality by its rural-urban and inland-coastal components, but their study is 
only for the post refonn years of 1983-1995. 
(:sing  a recently released set of provincial and national data covering the second 
half of 201h century, we are able to construct a comprehensive time series of regional 
inequality in China, including its decompositioris into rural-urban and inland-coastal 
components, from 1952 to 1999. LVe  find that changes in regional inequality match the 
phases of Chinese history remarkably well, as do its rural-urban and inland-coastal 
components.  The peaks of inequality in China have been associated with the Great 
Famine, the Cultural Revolution, and the current phase of openness and decentralization. 
Ure further use econometric analysis to establish that regional inequality is explained to 
different degrees in different phases by three key variables: the share of heavy industry in 
gross output value, the degree of decentralization, and the degree of openness. 
The plan of the rest of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 details the construction 
of our long run time series, which builds on and extends earlier work in this area.  Section 
3 presents a narrative relating the ups and downs of regional inequality, and of its 
components, during the phases of Chinese Conununist history.  Section 4 builds on this 
wit11 an econometric analysis of the pre-reform and post-reform evolution of inequality. 
Section 5 concludes. An appendix discusses our data in great detail. 
11.  CONSTRUCTING A LONG RUN TIME SERlES FOR REGIONAL 
ISEQUALITY IN CHINA 
Ideally. for an analysls of the e%olutlon  of rneyual~ty  ocer Communist Chrnesc 
history we would have available representative national household surveys ovcr ihe eniirc 
period.  Unforttniately, .ivhilc such suneys have bee11 conducted throughout tlie last lifiy 
years, they are available to researchers only for the post reSonn period, and in any casc sporadically, for restricted years with varying but limited coverage. Thus, for example. 
Chen and Ravallion (1996) had access to official household survey data but only for four 
provinces between 1986 and 1990. Aaberge and Li (1997) analyze urban household 
surveys for Liaoning and Sichuan provinces for the same period, while Tsui (1998) 
analyses rural surveys for 1985, 1988, and 1990, but only for Guangdong and Sichuan. 
Yang (1999) analyses both rural and urban parts of the household survey for four years 
betxveen  1986 and 1994, also for Guangdong and Sichuan.  This different coverage across 
studies reflects the differential access to official data.  Researchers have also conducted 
and analyzed independent suneys----for example, Hussain et al., (1994) did one for 1986, 
Rozelle (1994) for Township and Village Enterprises between 1984 to 1989 in Jiangsu 
province, and Khan et a]., (1993) conducted a household survey for 1988. 
The inequality analysis that has been done on household surveys for the late 
1980s and 1990s, has been extremely valuable in illuminating specifics aspects of the 
distributional dimensions of Chinese development in the late 1980s and early 1990s. But 
the bottom line is that researchers simply do not have comprehensive access to household 
surveys which are national and which cover the entire, or even a substantial part of, the 
half-century sweep of Chinese history that is of interest to us in this paper. 
In the face of this data restriction, we are forced to look for data availability at 
higher levels of aggregation than at the household level.  And it turns out that certain 
types of data are indeed available at the province level_  disaggregated by rural and urban 
areas, stretching right back to 1952. Using recently released data, this papcr constructs a 
timc series of inequality by building up  information on real per capita consumption in  the rural and urban areas of 28 of China's 30 provinces (unfortunately, data availability is not 
complete for Tibet and Hainan provinces). 
With these sub-provincial rural and urban per capita consumption figures, and 
population weights for these areas, a national distribution ofreal per capita consun~ption 
can be constructed, and its inequality calculated, for each year between 1952 and 1999, 
thus covering the vast bulk of the period from I949 to the present.  Of course what this 
means is that overall household level-inequality is being understated, since inequality 
wiihin the rural and urban areas of each province is being suppressed.  Moreover, we 
cannot say anything about the evolution of household-level inequality witltitz these areas. 
Our measures do provide a lower bound on inequality over this eniire period.  But the 
fact remains that OLK study of inequality is essentially a study of regional inequality. 
A detailed discussion of our basic data is provided in the Appendix.  A number of 
studies have used province level data to study regional inequality in the past.  Many of 
them used Soviet type statistics in large part because long-term data series existed for 
these (e.g., Lyons, 1991; Tsui, 1991), and they did not in general disaggregate by rural 
and urban areas within provinces.  With the availability of rural-urban disaggregations on 
consumption per capita stretching back to the 1950s, these studies can be substantially 
improved and extended in terms of time and space coverage.  In the recent literature, 
Yang and Fang (2000) use the same data sources as us, but focus solely on the average 
rural urban gap at the national level, and do not go into inequalities across provinces. 
l'sing  the iilformaiion available, we calculate the Gini coefficient of inequality 
using thc standard 16rm~1la.  But the biilk of oi~r  arialysis is donc with a second inecluality ~ndex,  a member of the decomposable generali/ed  entropy (GE) class of incqualsty 
mcasures as developed by Shorrocks (1980, 1983): 
In the above equation, yi  is tile i"'  income measured as Chinese yuan, p  is the total sample 
mean, f(yi) is the population share of yi  in the total population and n is total population. 
The key feature of the GE measure is that it is additively decomposable.  For K 
exogenously given, mutually exclusive and exhaustive, groups indexed by g: 
In Equation 2,1, is inequality in the ,glh group, y,  is the mean of the gth  group and e,  is a 
vector of 1's of length n,,  where n,  is the population of the gt\roup.  f f n is the total 
population of all groups, then J,: -  represents the share of the g"  group's populatson 
n 
in the total population.  The lirst term on the riglit hand side of (2)  represents the within- 
wc.Ig 
group inequality. -LT  * 100 is the g'" group's contribution to total inequality.  The 
IlJ! simplicity, we present results in this paper only for c - 0 
The within-group inequality part in (2) represents the spread of the distributions in 
the subgroups; the between-group inequality indicates the distance between the group 
means.  The ratio of between-group inequality to within-group inequality can thus be 
regarded as a scalar polarisation index because it captures the avcrage distance between 
the groups in relation to the income differences seen within groups.  As income 
differences within group diminish, i.e., as the groups become more homogeneous 
internally, differences across groups are, relatively speaking, magnified and 
..  "polarisation" is higher.  Similarly, for given within group differences, as the groups 
means drift apart, polarisation increases.  Zhang and Kanbur (2001) define the 
polarisation index as: 
P = between-group inequalitylwithin-group inequality  (3) 
where bemeen-group inequality and within-group inequality are defined in (2).  With our 
time series of inequality in China over the long term, we are now in a position to 
investigate dimensions of inequality in the different phases of Chinese development over 
the past half century. 
111.  INEQUALITY CHANGE THROUGH THE PHASES OF CHINESE 
HISTORY: A NARRATIVE 
Follo>ving standard discussions (e.g., Schoppa, 2000j, Communist Chinese 
history can be dix:idcd  into several phases: 1919-56 (Revolution and Land Refoim). 
1957-61 (The Great Leap Forward and the Great Famine), 1962-65 (Post-Famine 
Recovery), 1966-75 (Cultural Revolution and Transition to Reformj, 1979-84 (Rural Reform) and 1985-present (Post Rural Rcfonn, Decentralization and Opening up to Trade 
and Foreign Direct Investment). 
Table 1 presents economic indicators for China from 1952 to 1999.  Figure 1 
shows the evolution of real per capita GDP through the different phases identified above. 
Figure 2 plots the evolution of three key indicators of economic policy and outcomes: the 
share of heavy industry in gross value octotal output (a measure of the bias against 
agriculture), the ratio of tariff revenue to total imports (a measure of the degree of 
openness), and the ratio of central government revenue to total revenue (a measure of 
decentralization).  Table 2 presents long-run inequality series, and Figure 3 graphs the 
evolution of Chinese regional inequality; as measured by the Giui and the GE indices, 
thrortgh the six phases of development identified above.  The two indices move in close 
relation to each other, and match the different phases of Chinese development remarkably 
well. 
Inequality was relatively low and steady in the very first years of communist rule 
when land reform was introduced.  However, it rose precipitously during the Great Leap 
Fonvard and the Great Famine, reaching an all time high for the entire period in 1960. [t 
fell during the recovery from the Great Famine, reaching a trough in 1967. But the 
effects of the Cultural Revolution, which began in late 1966, started an increase in 
inequality which peaked in 1976. The transition from the Cultural Revolution to the 
period of ntral reform saw a decline in inequality which gathered pace in the early 1980s 
and reached its trough in  1984. In the post rural refornr period after 1984, when China 
decentralized, opened up and expcricrrccd ~111  explosion of trade and forcign direct investment, inequality rose steadily and sharply right through to the end of our data 
series, in 1999. 
Thus over the past fifly years inequality has peaked three times--during  the Great 
Famine, at the end of the Cultural Revolution, and in the current period of global 
integration.  In fact, the Gini coefficient of regional inequality in China in 1999 exceeds 
the peak of ineqtiality reached at the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, and is more 
than 95 percent of the all time high at the peak of the Great Famine in 1960. Using the 
GE index, inequality in 1999 is about 98 percent of the all time high in 1960. 
Similarly, there are three major troughs in the overall evolution of inequality--in 
1952, right at the beginning of the data series; in  1967, at the end of the recovery from the 
Great Famine and before the effects of the Cultural Revolution set in; and in 1084, at the 
end of the niral reform period and the start of the expansion based on global integration. 
Overall, inequality seems to have been low when policy was encouraging to agriculture 
and the rural sector generally, and high when this sector was relatively neglected.  These 
effects can be further investigated by decomposing overall inequality into sub- 
components and examining the evolution of these component~. 
As discussed in the previous section, the CE index is subgroup additively 
decomposable, allowing us to look deeper into the make up of inequality. The 56 data 
points in each year from which the overall distribution is constructed, a rural and an 
urban observation for each of 28 provinces, can be divided into rural and urban 
observations across the provinces and; using equation (2j the GE can be decomposed into 
a "within rtiral-urban" (U'RU)  and a "bet~vcen  rural-urban" IBRL) component.  'I'hcsc 
conq~nncnts,  and the overall GE. arc sho~vn  in l'ahlc 2.  Following the ihmtula in (3);  the rural-urban polarisation index is calculated based on Table 2 and presented in Figure 4 as 
RU. 
A key dimension of inequality in China, especially irt the post-reform period, is 
that between irmlaud  and coastal provinces (Tsui, 1993; Chen and Fleisher, 1996; Yao 
1997; and Kanbur and Zhang, 1999). U'e  follow the practice of classifying the provinces 
of Beijing, Liaoning, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zheja~g,  Fujian, 
Guangdong and Guangxi as coastal and the other provinces as inland.  We therefore 
divide our 56 observations into 22 coastal and 34 inland observations and decompose the 
GE measure accordingly. The "within inland-coastal" (WIC) and "between inland- 
coastal" (BIC) components are reported in Table 2 and the inland-coastal polarisation 
index is shown in Figure 4 as IC. 
Figure 4 goes some way to translating the above narrative into impacts on 
inequality along the rural-urban and inland-costal divide, and provides some initial 
hypotheses for econometric testing in the next section.  Under the development strategy 
adopted after the initial period of land reform, almost all the scarce investment funds 
were allocated to heavy industry in neglect of light industv and agriculture.  As shown in 
Figure 2, the share of heavy industry in gross output value rose from 0.22 in 1956 to 0.52 
in 1960. To guarantee a low production cost for the heavy industry sector, agricultural 
product prices were suppressed to subsidize the cost-of-living of urban workers.  The 
zovemment also established the Hukou  system of household registration in this period,  - 
confining people to the village or city of their birth, in order to ensure there was enough 
agricultural labor to produce sufficient grain for urban workers (Solinger. 1993). 
Consequently, the large rum!-urban  di\iiie hcc;itne a major fcaturc of Chi~~a's  inecli~;rlit); (Yang, 1999; Yang at~d  Fang, 2000), and the policies eventually led to the Great Famine. 
During the Famine, however, most urban residents were protected from starvation at the 
expense of about 30 million deaths in the rural areas (Lin and Yang, 2000).  Tbcsc 
developments are reflected in the sharp increases, up to 1960, in the BRC' and TVIC 
component of GE in Table 2 and polarisation index RU in Figure 4. 
In reaction to the Great Famine, agriculture was once again given priority.  The 
slogan, "Yi  Liang Wei Gang, Gang Ju Mu Zhang" (Food must be taken to he the core; 
once it is grasped, everything falls into place), reflects the spirit of this policy.  In the 
years between 1961 and 1964, 20 million state workers and 17 million urban high school 
students were sent to the countryside for "re-education"  by participating in agricultural 
productio~~  (Selden, 1992).  Meanwhile, central planning was loosened a little, boosting 
agricultural productivity.  Not surprisingly, the share of heavy industry fell and the rural- 
urban divide narrowed.  This is reflected in the declining RC' during this period, which 
pulled down overall inequality to its next trough, just before the start of the Cultural 
Revolution. 
With the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, pro-Mao leftists came into 
the ascendancy.  The combination of lack of incentives in the agricultural sector and 
investment in military and heavy industry during the cold war atmosphere of the time, as 
reflected in the rise in the sbare of heavy industry in Figure 2, led to the rural-urban 
divide, as measured by the BRU and WIG components and RU, increasing to its peak at 
the end of the Cultural Revolution, on the eve of the 1979 reforms. 
iVith the end of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese economy ~vas  on the verge 
of collapse.  In response to the agricultural crisis, the government startcd to give greater incentives to household producers.  The "household responsibility"  systcnr spread from 
its origins in hhui  Province to cover 98 percent of all villages in China by 1983 (Lin, 
1992). These and other market-oriented strategies led to a remarkable groxvth in 
agricultural output, and the share of heavy industry dropped.  The first five years of the 
post-1979 reforms saw a decline in RU which is exceeded only by its decline after the 
peak of the Great Famine.  Overall inequality fell as well. 
The latest phase in Chinese history begins in the mid 1980s. As is well known, 
this has heen a period of accelerating integration illto the global economy through greater 
openness in trade and especially in Foreign Direct Investment. As seen in Figure 2, the 
effective tariff rate, after showing no trend for 35 years, began a steady decline during 
this period, both because of reductions in nominal tariffs and because of increased import 
volumes.  Total trade volumes tell the same story.  Between 1983 and 1999, the value of 
exports grew 11 percent per year.  Changes in FDI flows are even more astonishing. We 
do not of course have long run time series for these, but from an almost isolated economy 
in the late 1970s, China has become the largest recipient of FDI among developing 
cou~ltries. 
Some of these changes have been closely tied to giving local governments more 
incentives to attract FDI.  The government initiated a fiscal decentralization reform, 
granting local governments more autonomy in allocating their resources (Ma, 1997; Lin, 
Liu and Zhong, 1997; Qian and Rolandt 1998). Figure 2 shows that after a steady climb 
in the first phase of reform between 1979 and 1984, the share of ceritral government in 
tcital revenui: bcgan to decline  although thcrc are some large blips as the go\-ernmcnt its reassessed priorities periodically.'  But it is also on expenditures that the policy literature 
seems to suggest the decentralization has had its greatcst impact. 
As is by now \veil appreciated, and as is shown in Figure I. there has been 
spectacular growth in the last decade and a half.  Rut the gains have not been evenly 
distributed across regions.  Coastal provinces have attracted far more foreign direct 
investment and generated more trade volume than inland provinces during the 
liberalization process.  In 1999, the three coastal provinces, Guangdong, Jiangsu, and 
Shanghai, were the top three, while the three inland provinces, Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, 
and Jilin, were bottom three in terms of attracting FDI.  The above three coastal 
provinces alone contribute to more than 6096 of total foreign trade in 1999. The 
difference in the growth rates between the coastal and inland regions has been as high as 
three percentage points during the past two decades (Zhang and Zhang, 2001). 
We can use Guangdong and Sichuan provinces to illustrate how internal 
geography affects the response to openness. In 1978, the coastal Guangdong Province 
ranked 141h in labor productivity, which was almost as same as the 15Ih  rank of inland 
Sichuan province (Zhang and Zhang, 2001).  In a closed economy, Guangdong did not 
enjoy any obvious better resource endowments than inland provlnees.  However, afier 
China opened its door to the world, Guangdong has become the most favored place for 
foreign direct investment and international trade in large due io its proximity to Hong 
Kong.  Meanwhile, the ranking of labor productivity in Sichuan has declined from 1 jth  in 
1978 to 23'511  1999  Clearly, thc relat~be  comparaine ad~antages  betxeen the imo 
!,  Ilieic are also lihc1y to be data psublems a:  differcat piiii~ii  in rhis icrie!;  a sei~ilr  of changes iii coverage 
arid in dctinitions.  For example, the dara sv~ics  -ctm ti? ilio\%  some larg:  jumps in rlii :iiiii  !99ijs  iizv 
I'ablc  il-  1':  in  State Staiisiical Bureau.  1909). provinces have changed signiiicantly associated with the opening up to the outside ~uid 
the decentralization which facilitated this response. 
The above story of Gtiangdong and Sichuan is reflected nationwide in the 
behavior of the components of inequality.  The major change in the behavior of these 
components over the entire fifly-year period comes in the mid-1980s.  After relative 
stability up to this point, inland-coastal polarisation IC began to increase sharply. 
Although still quite small as a contributor to overall inequality, its contributions to 
chartges in inequality increased dramatically.  On the other hand the rural-urban divide, 
as mcasured by RU, declined. The behavior of IC and RU shows that the dynamic of 
inequality change, in this period of decentralization and openness, is increasingly 
operating through the inland-coastal divide, in sharp contrast to the dominant role played 
by the rural-urban divide in the period before the mid 1980s. 
Our narrative of the phases of Chinese development, and of the evolution of 
inequality and its components, is suggestive of the forces behind the changes in 
inequality over this half century.  We now turn to an econometric analysis of the 
correlates of inequality, to see if these hypotheses can be coilfirmed statistically. 
IV.  THE CORRELATES OF REGIONAl. INEQUALITY: AN ECONOMETRIC 
ANALYSIS 
4. I  f-iypotheses on Regional Ineqziiriity 
The previous discussion has highlighted three key aspects of policy which may 
have affected the evolution of inequality in China over the past fifty years-the  relative 
balance bctwccn hcavy industry and agriculture, the degree of decentralization, and ihe 
degrce of openness to the outside \vorld.  Let us first of all disc~~ss  each of these in turn. The heavy industry develop~nent  strategy in the pre-reform period violated 
China's  cornparati\-e advantage at the tinre that capital was scarce and labor was 
abundant.  To provide enough funding for investment in heavy industry, the government 
had to inlplement a eontmune production system to estract stlrplus from the agricultural 
sector.  The colnrnune system lacked incentives for fanners to exert their full effort, 
thereby leading to low labor productivity in the agricultural sector.  To ensure low food 
cost for urban workers, agricultural product prices had to be suppressed as well. This 
leads to ihe hypothesis that, particularly in the pre-refom period, the heavq--industry 
development strategy was a major contributing factor to the large rural-urban divide and 
to overall inequality.  This is the hypothesis implied in Lin, Cai, and Li  (1 996) and 
elaborated by Yang and Cai (2000). 
Under the planned system, the central government had large powers to allocate 
and utilize financial resources.  Changes in the structures of the revenue sharing formula 
directly affected local governments' incentive to provide local public goods and enhance 
growth (Ma, 1997; Lin, Liu, and Zhong, 1997; Qian and Roland, 1998; Zhang and Zou, 
1998). Vv'hile Lin, Liu, and Zhong (1 997) and Zhang and Zou (1998) have in particular 
analyzed the relationship behveen fiscal decentralization and ecoilomic growth for China, 
few studies except Tsui (1991) have investigated the effect of decentralization on 
regional inequality.  Tsui (1991) detected a positive relationship between decentralization 
and worsen regional inequality using a graph analysis based on data series up to only 
1985. Based on lessons drawn from other countries, Prud'homme (1995) has cautioned 
on the possible detrimental effects of decentralization on inequality. This lcads to itlc hypothesis that decentralization affects regional inequality during the economic transition 
from a planned economy to a market economy. 
When an economy opens up to world markets, theory suggests that there could 
tvcll he affects on regional inequality, as argued recently by Fujita, Krugman, and 
Venables (1 999).  External trade liberalization can change internal comparative 
advantage and hence location patterns.  Coupled with decentralization, opening up to 
world markets provides local governments an opportunity to better exploit comparative 
advantage.  Trade liberalization could also lead to specialization and industry clustering. 
Empirical evidence for the impact of globalization on income distribution in developing 
countries has been limited, and the findings of existing studies are at best mixed.  The 
existing  work  for  developing  countries  has  been  limited  to  the  effects  of  trade 
liberalization on wage inequality (for example, Wood, 1997; Robbins, 1996; Hanson and 
Harrison,  1999), shedding little light on the effect on regional inequality in developing 
countries.  Jian, Sachs, and Warner (1996) have argued that China's regional inequality is 
associated with internal geography. China's rapid change fiom a closed economy to open 
economy provides  a good testing  ground  for our third hypothesis: greater openness is 
associated with greater regional inequality. 
4.2 Econometric Testing 
Our task is to test the association between inequality and its components on the 
one hand, and heavy industrialization, decentralization, and openness, on the other. 
Following several analyses on Chinese data (eg. Lin, 1992), we use one-period lagged 
>  values of the independent variables as regressors:  A central issue in this long run time 
'  Given data restrictions it is ~~npossiblr  to find suitable alternative initru~iii-sits  covering thc eritire 50  year- 
period under consideration. 
15 series is that of structural breaks.  It is common in the econometric literature on China 
(e.g., Lin 1992; Li, 2000) to locate the break at the start of the reforms in the late 1970s. 
Chow tests found the most strongly significant break to be for 1979, so our results are 
presented separately for the pre-refonn period (1952-1978) and the post-reform period 
(1979-1999), in Tables 3 and 4:  respectively.3 All the variables are in logarithms.  We 
have compared regressions in levels and in log levels and the latter gives better fit based 
on R-square and RESET misspecification test.  In addition, the heteroscedasticity 
problem is greatly reduced after taking logarithms.  In addition to the regression 
coefficients, Tables 3 and 4 also present R-square and the Phillips-Ouliaris test for 
cointegration." 
Consider Table 3 first and start with the results for overall inequality.  It shows 
that the heavy industry coefficient is the only one significant, and has the highest value. 
The P-0 test rejects the hypothesis of no cointegration.  However, for the components of 
inequality the P-0  test cannot reject no cointegration.  We therefore consider the results 
for regressions on the first differences.  The only significant variable is that of 
centralization for rural-urban polarisation, and its sign suggests that decentralization is 
associated with greater inequality in this dimension 
Turning to the post reform period, in Table 4, we see that in the levels regression 
for total inequality, no cointegration cannot be rejected.  Regression in first differences 
once again shows up centralization as the significant variable, with a negative sign.  Both 
'  Furthemorc, Perron i, 1989) argues tlrat stalidurd tcsti for tationarit) and coniiitegration mill not ho!d  if 
the timc series has a structural break. 
The Phillips and Ouliaris test (1990, PO for short) is dcsigneil to detect the prescilcc of a unit soot in tbc 
residuals uf (coiiltcgrating) rigressions among thc !c~;cls  of time scrics.  If the rcsidnals have rr i~!lit  root; 
then the tinie series considered are ilut coiritegraicd.  ?he null Iiypothesis is no coiiitegratioii.  The critical 
values for the 1'0  test can be hund in the apperiiiix oil'hillips  and Ouliarir i 199i)j. rural-urban and inland-coastal regressions are cointegrated in levels.  For rural-urban 
polarisation, all three variables are significant, while for the inland-coastal polarisation, 
only centralization and effective tariff rate are significant.  But notice, however, the 
opposite signs for each of the three variables.  Greater decentralization increases rural- 
~~rban  polarisation but reduces inland-coastal polarisation.  Greater openness, as measured 
by a lower effective tariff rate, reduces the rural-urban divide but increases that between 
inland and coastal provinces.  A greater favoring of heavy industry increases rural-urban 
spread but decreases the inland-coastal spread. 
Overall, these results represent broad support for the hypotheses advanced earlier 
on heavy industry, decentralization, and openness. Heavy industry increases inequality, 
especially its rural-urban component, and particularly in the pre-1979 period. 
Decentralization, when it is significant, increases overall inequality and rural-urban 
polarisation.  However, note that decentralization is negatively associated with inland- 
coastal polarization, which goes against the argument that giving Provinces greater power 
has necessarily had detrimental effects on all components of inequality.  The effective 
tariff rate is (understandably) only significant in the post-1979 period.  A lower tariff rate, 
which can arise either as the result of lower nominal tariffs andor  higher import volumes, 
is associated with greater inequality overall.'  However, it increases inland-coastal 
polarisation but reduces the rural-urban divide. 
CVc  note here criticisms ol'Rodrik  (2000j oil mrious staiidard measures of"opennrss'.  Since our 
measure is based partly on iradr volumes it does not fully isolate tlie pure effects of a policy ofopeiiiiess. V.  CONCLUSIONS 
The tremendous growth in per capita GDP since tlic reform pcriod, and its impact 
on poverty in China, has been much discussed and celebrated (Chen and Ravallion, 1996; 
Piazza and Liang, 1998; Fan, Zhang, and Zhang, 2000).  But this l~as  not stopped a 
concern with growing inequality, for at least hvo reasons.  First, as is well known, the 
poverty reducing effects of a given growth rate on povel?y are lower at higher levels of 
inequality (e.g., Ravallion, 2001).  Secondly, rising inequality may itself lead to tensions 
within a country and impede the prospects for future growth through a variety of social, 
political and economic mechanisms (for recent reviews see Kanbur, 2000; Kanbur and 
Lustig, 2000).  111  the ease of China, such concerns have been expressed widely (e.g., Hu 
,4ngang, 1996; Li, 1996). 
This stttdy tries to comprehend the driving forces behind the changes in China's 
regional inequality over half a century.  We find that the evolution of inequality matches 
different political-economic periods in Chinese history.  In particular, we find that heavy- 
industry prioritizing development policy plays a key role in fonning the enormous rural- 
urban gap in the pre-reform period, while openness has contributed to the rapid increase 
in inland-coastal disparity in the reform period of the 1980s and the 1990s. 
The empirical finding also has rclevance to the ongoing debate on how 
globalization affects regional inequality in developing countries.  Convergence or 
divergence of a nation's economy is dependent upon not only on domestic polices but 
also openness.  IVith China joining LVTO, the economy will become more liberalized, 
and open: likely resulting in nlorc dramatic shifts in regional comparative advantages.  If 
the goxcrnment contin~~es  to favor the coz~sral  region in its investment strategy, then regional disparity inay widen even more.  Futther liberalizing and investing in the 
economy in the inland region is thus an important development strategy for the 
government to both promote economic growth and reduce regional inequality. References 
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Following Kanbur and Zhang (1999), this study uses rural and urban per capita 
consumption expenditure data at the provincial level, but covering a longer period 1952- 
1999. Prior to 1983, the consumption expenditure data are obtained from Regional 
Historical Statistical iMaterials Compilation (1  949-1  989).  After 1982, these data are 
from various issues of Clzina Statisrics Yearbook. These average expenditures are 
compiled from annual rural and urban household survey data by the China State 
Statistical Bureau (SSB).  In the China Statistics Yearbook, alongside the nominal 
expenditures, the annual growth rates of real expenditures for rural and urban residents at 
a provincial level since 1982 are also published on the basis of separate rural and urban 
price indices.  China did not start radical price reform until October 1984 when the 
central govenunent lifted the control over all the prices of small con~modities  completely 
(Tang, 1987). Before that, prices were under strict control by state governments and 
allowed to fluctuate only within a 2 percent bound each year mainly for the purpose of 
keeping prices stable instead of allowing them to be market signals reflecting supply and 
demand (Tang, 1987).  As a result, "in  1983, free prices covered only approximately 4 
per cent of the items in domestic trade" (Guo, 1992, p. 43). On this basis, we assume that 
price levels were the same for all provinces prior to 1983, and that nominal expenditures 
are equivalent to real expenditures. Under this assun~ption,  the real expenditures for the 
period from 1983 to 1999, which is the latest available year, can be derived fro111 the base 
year's nominal expenditures and the published annual growth rates of real expenditures. 
In China, own protluciion constitiites a larse share of consumption ibr rural 
liouseholds (Chen and Raxaliion, 1'196).  It is worth nitntionii~g  ho1.t  rural consumption expenditures are estimated by the SSB.  Prior to 1990, the consuniption from self- 
production was valued at fixed state prices, which rrlight be different from market prices. 
Efowever, the sale of products and purchased inputs are all valued at market prices. As a 
result, using fixed state prices instead of market prices to value the consumption from 
self-production for the period from prior to 1990 may lead to an underestimation of 
expenditures for rural rcsidents (Chen and Ravallion, 1996). Also, the officially used 
sampling method and income (expenditure) definition may result in underestimation of 
the overall inequality (Khan et al., 1993). In addition, there exist some non- 
comparability between rural and urban residents.  For instance, urban residents enjoy 
housing and medical care subsidies while rural residents do not.  In spite of these 
shortcomings of the consumption expenditure measure, it is the only summary measure at 
a provincial level that is readily available, consistently compiled, and covers both rural 
and urban populations in all the provinces for nearly half century. 
We also need rural and urban population weights for each province.  These data 
can be found from Comprehensive Statistical Duta und Materials On 50 Years ofiVew 
China. Urban and rural residencies refer to the status registered in the household register 
system. Principally speaking, rural and urban residents are supposed to specialize in farm 
work and non-farm work in their registration areas, respectively.  The strict hoiisehold 
register system prevents population from moving freely to a large extent.  However, with 
the success of rural reform, many workers are freed up from agriculture activities and 
move to urban areas, especially to big cities, to seek opportunities tvithout any 
cntitlcn~ent  to subsidies like urban rcsidents.  These floating nligrants are not covered in 
thc SSR sample that includes on14 the rczistered resident households.  Hence, possible biases result from using the official registered numbers of rural anti urban population. 
However, Illore than 80 percent of these floating migrants are laborers who work outside 
during the off-harvest season and send remittances back hon~e  to support their family 
(China Dcvelopnzent Report  IYYJ;).  In the rural expenditure survey, remittance is listed 
as one source of income (Tsui,  1998), reducing some of the bias resulting from migration 
that is not captured by the official population statistics. Table i 
CHI'\%:  ECOiVOVIIC ICVDICA  TORS, 19.52-1  999 
-  - -  --  -- 
Year  GDP  Import  Tariff  Total revenue  Centrai budget  Tariff rate (Sb)  Centralization  industrialization 
(Biilion)  (Billion)  (Billion)  (Biiiion)  (Biliion)  (%)  (%) 
1952  fi7 9  3.8  0.5  18.8  14 Q  12.8  79.4  15.3 
Uote:  Coiumns 2-6 are from C.'orriprchensii.r  Stiiii~~:icuI  D'irn  nriii 1ff1ierini.s on iii !)or;.  i$\;.%i  (%:r?'i. 
industrialization is share of tllc .;a!ue  uf heavy indiistry oiipnt in rlie gross uutpot \.aIiie of agrii.ultiir;ll and 
industry; tariffrate is defiiicd as tile ratio oftariffrcvciiiic to total iiiiports: cciiiraliratioii iui1i.x is thc raao 
oTcei~tral  govemn:ent's  revenue {both  buiigciar)  axid  cxtra-biidgeiai-yj to tord gal-ernmeiit rcii.niie. Table 2 
- - --  -  ~  .- -  -.yL.L-p--..Te-.  .  .~ 
Year  Gini (%)  GE  Within  ~etween 
Rural-Urban  inland-Coast  Rural-Urban  Inland-Coast 
1952  21.6  0.084  0.027  0.078  0.057  0.006 Table 3 
REGRESSIONS RESULTS: PIE-REFORM PERIOD (1 952-78) 
.-----  --  .  . 
Level  Difference 
Variables  Total inequality Rural-Urban  Inland-coast  Total inequality Rural-Urban  Inland-coast 
(GE)  polarisation  polarisation  (GE)  poiarisation  polarisation 
--  .- 
Intercept  -1.397**  1.027*  -5.413**  -0.017  0.022  0.004 
(0.258)  (0.544)  (1.329)  (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.072) 
Centralization  0.115  -0.443**  -0.143  -0.072  -0.242**  -0.298 
(0.076)  (0.116)  (0.1  75)  (0.078)  (0.067)  (0.207) 
Effective tariff rate  0.053  -0.051  0.012  0.026  0.120  -0.341 
(0.068)  (0.187)  (0.525)  (0.088)  (0.096)  (0.407) 
Heavy industry ratio  0.526**  0.167  -1.290**  0.423  0.166  -0.973 
(0.176)  (0.219)  (0.316)  (0.305)  (0.178)  (0.828) 
~~  ~  ~.~  ~..~~  .. -.  .-  . 
Phillips-Ouliaris  test  -3.91  7*  -1.620  -1.656  -4.778*"  -5.213**  -4.710** 
Si~tc:  Ail tlie variables arc in logaritlunic fornls.  Phillips-Ouliaris Z, test is fbr testing the 11ul1  hypothesis of no cointegration. The critical values to rejcct this 
~iull  liyl~otl~csis  are --3.833 and --4.112  for significance levels at the 10% and 5%.  respectively.  Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors.  * and ** 
indlcnte statlst~cal  significal~ce  at the 10% and 5%, respectively. Table 4 
REGRESSIONS RESULTS: REFORM PERIOD (1979-99) 
*L.-  ~--~--".."~,""%--*>-.-~"-- 
Level  ~ifferince 
Variables  Total inequality  Rural-Urban  Inland-coast  Total inequality  Rural-Urban  Inland-coast 
(GE)  polarisation  polarisation  (GE)  polarisation  poiarisation 
intercept  -3.862**  1.088**  -3.930**  0.016  -0.072**  0.060 
(0.296)  (0.386)  (0.269)  (0.022)  (0.031)  (0.040) 
Centralization  -0.494**  -1.015**  0.357**  -0.318*  0.144  -0.175 
(0.107)  (0.191)  (0.192)  (0.1  76)  (0.264)  (0.280) 
Effective tariff rate  -0.305**  0.253**  -0.787**  -0.086  -0.030  -0.384* 
(0.037)  (0.056)  (0.051)  (0.111)  (0.176)  (0.21  5) 
Heavy industry ratio  -0.201  0.468*  -0.1  36  -0.082  0.486  -0.129 
(0.166)  (0.246)  (0.278)  (0.227)  (0.287)  (0.358) 
.-  .- 
-2.681  -3.944*  -4.285**  -3.880*  -5.056**  -4.456** 
R-square  0.868  0.862  0.958  0.124  0.132  0.236 
----*-  .  --  ..-pm-.-.-w*  ---.-. 
Kucc: Ail the variahic~s  al-c in logarithmic fonns Phillips-Ouliaris Z,  test is for testing the null hypotl~esis  of no coiotegration.  'fie critical values to reject this 
ir~ill  liyi~uthesis  for tlirec variables arc -3.833  and -4.1  12 for sigi~ificancs  levels at the 10% and 596, rcspectively.  Figures iii parentheses are robust standard 
i'rrors. * *lid ** iiiiiicate statistical significance at the 10% and 5%, respectively. 0' 
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